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A STUDY OF CARBURETOR/INDUCTION SYSTEM
ICING IN GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS
By Richard W. Obermayer and William T. Roe
Manned Systems Sciences, Inc.
Northridge, California
SUMMARY
The purpose of this study,was to perform,a current
assessment of the frequency and severity of carburetor/inductionicing in general-aviation accidents. The available literature
and accident data from the National Transportation Safety Board
were collected. A computer analysis of the accident data wasperformed. Between 65 and 90 accidents each year involve
carburetor/induction system icing as a probable cause/factor.
Under conditions conducive to carburetor/induction icing,between 50 and 70 percent of engine malfunction/failure
accidents (exclusive of those due to fuel exhaustion) are due to
carburetor/induction system icing. Since the evidence of suchicing may not remain long after an accident, it is probablethat the frequency of occurrence of such accidents is under-
estimated; therefore, some extrapolation of the data was
conducted in this study., The problem of carburetor/induction
system icing is particularly acute for pilots with less than 1000hours of total flying time. The severity of such accidents is
about the same as any accident resulting from a forced landing orprecautionary landing. About 144 persons, on the average, areexposed to death and injury each year in accidents involving
carburetor/induction icing as a probable cause/factor.
INTRODUCTION
The conditions in the carburetor and induction system of
aircraft engines are such that ice can be formed, even on sunny,
warm days. There are ordinarily some indications to the pilot
of the onset of such icing such as a decrease in RPM or manifold
pressure. If the pilot does not take appropriate timely action
engine malfunction/failure may occur, and at times airstart of
the engine may be difficult or impossible. The pilot must be
aware of the possibilities of carburetor/induction icing and
routinely make proper use of carburetor heat controls. The
pilot must also be aware that use of carburetor heat controls at
the wrong times can also lead to difficulty.
It is generally known that carburetor/induction system
icing causes a number of accidents each year. The purpose of
this study is to make a current assessment of the frequency and
severity of the problem, to provide a basis for determining if
corrective research should be conducted.
A broad definition of "carburetor ice" will be used in this
report. Generally, the term carburetor/induction system ice
will be used in this report to indicate icing throughout the
fuel, carburetor, or induction systems while in operation.
Carburetor/induction system icing consists of three categories:
(1) Impact ice, which occurs when super-cooled moisture-laden
air strikes elements of the induction system. Build-up of such
ice occurs when operating in snow, sleet, rain, or clouds.
(2) Throttle icing, which occurs when moisture in the induction
air condenses and freezes due to the expansion cooling and
lower pressure as the air passes the restriction imposed by the
throttle. (3) Fuel-evaporation icing, which occurs when cooling
of the fuel mixture by fuel vaporization causes entrained
moisture to freeze.
The current study collected available literature and
accident data, and subsequently analyzed the accident data to
determine the frequency of occurrence and severity of accidents
for which carburetor/induction system icing was a probable cause
or factor. The study included the following specific tasks:
(1) establishment of available data sources, (2) search of the
available literature, (3) collection of data from specific
individuals and organizations, and organized data bases of
accident records, (4) formation of a computer data base of
relevant accident data, and (5) performance of an analysis of
these data and a statistical summary. The results of these
efforts, along with discussion and conclusions, are presented in
this report.
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SURVEY ANALYSES
Three types of searches were conducted during the course of
this study: (1) a search for accident data bases relevant to
the study of carburetor/induction icing in general aviation,(2) a search for published literature pertinent to aviation
accident statistics, accident investigation methods, carburetor/induction system icing, engineering for icing protection, and
analyses of pilot error-related accidents, and (3) a follow-up
survey to determine the extent of the future use of carburetorsin aircraft design.
Search for Accident Data
Based on a survey of information available in the NASA
Flight Research Center Library, an initial list was made offederal aviation agencies, safety institutions, flight schools,
recognized authorities, foreign agencies, and manufacturers of
airframes, engines and carburetors. These sources were queriedby mail or telephone: Did they have relevant information?
Were they aware of data existing elsewhere? Who else would they
suggest we contact? In this way, data were collected and
additional sources were discovered. When no new sources were
.uncovered, the process was stopped, and it was assumed that
complete coverage had been achieved. A list of the persons and
organizations contacted is presented in Appendix A.
The search for accident data extended throughout the UnitedStates, Canada, and Mexico. While specific documents were
elicited from-many sources, it became clear there is but one
organized general aviation accident data base which is maintained
by the National Transportation Safety Board. No organized database is maintained in Canada and Mexico. In this country, both
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Federal
Aviation Agency (FAA) conduct accident investigations, but the
maintenance of a data base is the responsibility of NTSB.
As a result, the efforts of this study subsequently
concentrated on familiarization with the NTSB data base and with
acquisition of a subset of the data base suitable for this study.
Speific training information for accident investigators was
provided by the Transportation Safety Institute, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma (ref. 1) and personal contact established with NTSB
personnel. A description of the data base'contents is provided
in references 2, 3 and 4.
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Literature Search
The Southern California area is host to many fine libraries
which were available for the conduct of this study. In
particular, the University of California, Los Angeles; the
University of Southern California, California State University,
Northridge; and Los Angeles Pierce College have all been
extensively searched. The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Flight Research Center Library provided many
aviation-specific documents these other sources could not. As
might be expected, the literature pertinent to the topic of this
study is not large. The References and Selected Bibliography of
this report presents the results of the search of these
libraries.
Many of these documents influenced the conduct of this
study: however, three are selected for specific comment in this
report:
Special Study: Carburetor Ice in General Aviation (Ref. 5).-
The authors cite that: "During the latest 5-year period for
which complete data are available, there was a total of 360
general aviation accidents involving carburetor ice as a probable
cause or factor. There were 40 fatalities and 160 persons
injured, 40 of them seriously, in these accidents. The number ofpersons exposed to death or injury in these accidents was 636;47 aircraft were destroyed and 313 others substantially damaged."
The blame for these accidents is laid squarely on the pilot,
stating that these can be attributed to the pilot in virtually
all cases. Further, carburetor icing is considered by NTSB as
one of the "unnecessary" causal factors in general aviation
accidents, since "carburetor icing can be avoided because the
means to preclude it are readily available." While it may betrue that the pilot has the means to prevent carburetor icing,
consider the following complex procedures which are recommendedin this document to avoid such icing:
"1. Periodically check carburetor heat systems and controlsfor proper condition and operation.
"2. Start engine with carburetor heat control in the "cold"position, to avoid possible damage to the carburetor heat system.
"3. As preflight item, check carburetor heat availabilityby noting heat "on" power drop.
"4. When the relative humidity is above 50 percent and the
ambient temperature is below 299.80 K (800F), use carburetorheat immediately before takeoff. In general, carburetor heatshould not be used during taxi because of possible foreign
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matter entry when intake air is unfiltered in the "alternate" or
carburetor heat "on" position.
"5. Conduct takeoff without carburetor heat unless extremecarburetor icing conditions are present, when carburetor heat maybe used if approved by aircraft manufacturer, and when conditions
are such that there will still be ample power for takeoff withoutincurring engine overheat damage.
"6. Remain alert for takeoff for indications of carburetor
icing, especially when the relative humidity is above 50 percent,
or when visible moisture is present.
"7. With supplemental instrumentation, such as a carburetor
air temperature gage, partial carburetor heat should be used as
necessary to maintain gage temperatures to forestall icing.Without such instrumentation, use full heat but only intermit-
tently if considered necessary.
"8. If carburetor ice is suspected of causing a power loss,immediately apply full heat. Do not disturb throttle initially,
since throttle movement may kill engine if heavy icing ispresent. Watch for further power loss to indicate effect of
carburetor heat, then rise'in power as ice melts.
"9. In case carburetor ice persists after a period of fullheat, gradually move throttle to full open position and climb
aircraft at maximum rate available in order to obtain greatest
amount of carburetor heat. If equipped with mixture control,
adjust for leanest practicable mixture, (approach this remedy
with caution 
- although carburetor ice generally serves to
enrich mixture, the reverse can be true; if the engine is lost
through excessive leaning, an airstart might be impossible with
an iced induction system).
"10. Avoid clouds as much as possible.
"11. In severely iced conditions, and when equipped with
mixture control, backfiring the engine can sometimes be effectivein dislodging induction system ice. With carburetor heat
control "off", lean engine while at full throttle (observe
caution note in No. 9, above).
"12. Consider that carburetor icing can occur with ambient
temperature as high as 310.9 0 K (1000F) and humidity as low as50 percent. Remain especially alert to carburetor icing
possibilities with a combination of ambient temperature below
294.3 0 K (70°F) and relative humidity above 80 percent.
However, the possibility of carburetor ice decreases in the
range below 273.1 0K (32 F). This is because of (a) lessened
humidity as the temperature decreases, and (b) at around 263.7 0K(150P) any entrained moisture becomes ice crystals which pass
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through the induction system harmlessly. It should be remembered
that if the intake air does contain these ice crystals,
carburetor heat might actually cause carburetor icing by melting
the crystals and raising the moisture-laden air to the carburetor
icing temperature range.
"13. Prior to closed-throttle operation, such as for a
descent, apply full heat and leave on throughout throttled
sequence. Periodically, open throttle during extended closed
throttle operation so that enough engine heat will be produced
to prevent icing. Be prepared to remove carburetor heat if
go-around is initiated.
"14. Return control to "cold" position immediately after
landing. If carburetor heat should be further required, observe
ground operation precaution in (4), above."
The above routing use of carburetor heat, and the awareness
of possible icing conditions in the induction system, are
probably not appreciated by any but the more experienced pilots.
Consequently, this special study by NTSB was produced to improve
pilot awareness, attention, and/or carefulness to reduce the
number of accidents of this type.
Aircraft Carburetor Icing Studies (Ref. 6).- The National
Research Council of Canada conducted an investigation into the
prevention of carburetor icing in aircraft by the use of
gasoline-soluble inhibitors. In addition to, or instead of,
using gasoline additives, the possibility of treating interior
components of the carburetor on which ice is formed was
investigated.
An engine test procedure was developed that (1) produced
sufficient carburetor ice to affect engine performance, and
(2) allowed engine performance to be monitored. It was possible
to select temperature, humidity, and throttle plate settings to
give the most severe icing conditions.
The importance of this study is that it established a basis
for hoping that the best possible solution to the problem of
carburetor icing can be achieved -- that of eliminating the
problem. In this study the use of a teflon-coated throttle
plate was studied and found to virtually eliminate any ice
formation on the plate. The use of ethylene glycol monomethyl
ether at 0.10 - 0.15 percent by volume in the gasoline and the
teflon-coated plate was shown to prevent both carburetor and
fuel system icing. Coating the shaft at the point where it
enters the barrel wall may be required to eliminate all ice
deposits.
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Icing-Protection Requirements for Reciprocating-Engine
Induction Systems (Ref. 7).- This study provides an extensive
and comprehensive discussion of the various types of icing
associated with the generic term of "carburetoi icing", and,
from these investigations, establishes criteria for safe
operation and for design of new induction systems.
The opinion is reinforced that "the symptoms associated
with induction-system icing are not always discernible and
recognition of icing conditions generally requires considerable
operational experience." And, "The icing problem remains a
serious hazard, despite the fact that the induction systems on
most licensed aircraft are capable of providing sufficient
protection in all weather conditions if th$ppr6tection is
correctly applied and at the proper time". 'Further, a study by
Weick (ref. 8) of light-airplane power plant failures in 1947 is
cited, in which it is indicated that "34 percent of the forced
landings were caused by ineffective carburetor heat or by non-
application or improper application of carburetor heat". This
analysis was based on one-seventh of the total 92-53 privately
operated airplane mishaps recorded by the Civil Aeronautics
Board for the year.
The methods and techniques for this research are presented,
including both airborne and ground-based test installations.
The temperature and the pressure of the air supplied to either
the airborne or ground-based induction system were carefully
controlled and measured at the carburetor inlet. Moisture
content of the air was regulated by steam jets to control
humidity and by water sprays to provide water in excess of
saturation. Instrumentation was provided to measure rates of
air flow, fuel flow, and simulated rain injection, as well as
carburetor and supercharger pressures, carburetor metering
pressures, and other variables affected by icing.
This study also reflects on a possible approach to the
carburetor icing problem: displaying information to the pilot
which will allow him to more readily detect and diagnose
carburetor/induction system icing. It is pointed out that
numerous instruments have been designed for this purpose,
including (1) interruption of a light beam focussed on a
photocell, (2) the blocking of special air passages to upset a
pressure-differential system, (3) a comparison of pressure drop
through'an ice-free air passage and the induction system, and(4) the change in capacitance between charged plates due to
icing.
The authors conclude that none of these ice detectors is-
entirely satisfactory because of the difficulty in locating the
sensing elements in positions in which they will register any
type of icing. Further, many detectors have been erratic and
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indicate falsely. The authors feel that "a suitable ice detector
must be an extremely reliable instrument to retain pilot con-
fidence." In general, the use of ice-warning devices had been
unsatisfactory and none had been accepted for general use at
that time (circa 1950).
Trends in the Future Use of Carburetor-type Aircraft
While fuel-injected engines retain the danger of induction
system icing, the danger of.icing in a carburetor is removed.
High-performance engines using fuel injection are available in
general aviation. If fuel-injected engines were to eventually
exclude carburetor designs from future aircraft, then the
nature of the carburetor/induction system icing problem could
change. To test this hypothesis, and to collect data on future
trends in aircraft manufacture, a questionnaire was sent to the
major airframe manufacturers to determine their future plans.
Unfortunately, the attempt was fruitless, and no meaningful data
were collected in regard to this question. Informal communica-
tion with the four major engine manufacturers (Continental,
Franklin, Avco-Lycoming, and Pratt & Whitney) indicate a desire
to increase production of fuel-injection-type engines, but the
situation is not expected to change in the near future.
Examination of existing aircraft designs and lists of available
engine types for future design indicates that the carburetor-type
aircraft will predominate in the near future.
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THE COMPUTER DATA BASE
The computer data base was formed using data provided on
magnetic tapes by the Safety Analysis Division, Bureau ofAviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board, Department
of Transportation. Data were requested on all accidents involv-ing engine malfunction/failure in general aviation from 1968through 1973. The magnetic tapes provided were compatible withthe IBM 360 computer system on which they were produced, andtherefore required conversion to run on the CDC Cyber 70 computer
system at the NASA Flight Research Center.
The information potentially contained for each accident inthe data base is shown in Figure 1 in the form of the analysis
sheet which is completed by the accident investigator and
subsequently key-punched for computer entry. While only 55 ofover 350 data items are mandatory for each accident,,the total
amount of data is large and much is unnecessary for this study.Consequently, to increase the efficiency of analysis, the database was reduced in content and number of accidents.
First, the content of each accident record was reduced tothose items of information relevant to the current study. The41 items selected are presented in Table I. The codes used for
those items which are not entered directly as a numericalquantity are given in Table II.
Secondly, only accident records for the years 1969 through1973 were retained (five years). Accident records for the fewaccidents which occurred outside the continental United States
were also discarded, as most of these contained very littleinformation. Also, only accident records for fixed-wing
aircraft with reciprocating engines.were retained. It wasbelieved that the problems of rotary-wing aircraft were
inconsistent with the problems of fixed-wing aircraft. Only
reciprocating-engine-type aircraft accidents were retained, sincethe term "carburetor ice" does not apply to turbine engines.
Lastly, accident records which involved fuel exhaustion wereremoved from the data base since (1) a large number of engine-
malfunction/failure accidents are due simply to running out ofgasoline (approximately 170 accidents per year), and (2) such
accidents are irrelevant to a study of carburetor icing. Thefinal data base contained 3555 records of the original 59'30'
records.
Summary.- The final data base of 3555 records is character-ized by the following conditions:
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CAIID NO. 00 IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
DATE LOCATION AIRCRAT MA AIRCRAFT MODEL COLLISION I E E IDENTIFIER
CARD NO. 01 GENERAL INFORMATION
ACARD NO. 2 EMERGENCY CONDITIONSCO
CARD NO. 023 FLIGHT ITINERARYENCY CONDITIONS
WEATEREPARTURE POINT AS AIONED EN G PO T INFORMATIONNTENDED DESTNATON
/ ACCIDENT sITE / PLOTDATA
I 0/ 0LA, TERL / TELEVATION
CARD NO 8 INJURIES
C Mi N z T F C M NIR F C N n T
CARD NO. 03 GHT ITRERARY
I I DEPARTURE POINT LAST PLANNED ENROUlE LANDING POINT MENDED DESTINATION
0 'T PW " I I I I [ I II
CARD NO. 04 ACCIDENT SITEIOT DATA
FAA PERSONNEL T.. PERONNE
ACCIDNT SITE C PILOT DATAT
CARD NO.5 6ICAUWE
I T 7 . CNT F I 21 2 1 N1 i
5 16 1 1 . 3I 53 2
040
CARD NO. 064 AURIEIARS
CARD NO. 10 INJURES
C,, / PILOT j CIT PASEN
C M NI IM I N I z- L T
. T - C 663- N -' Z 9 P C 62
1'301 1 1 2 1 .9 6 I I I77 I I11
CARD NO. 09 INJURIS
PILOT FLI7H T GI NEE T I I IT OI
CARe NO. 12 INJURIES
66 N T F CM N ZI F IC I I T
D NO. 13 INJIRIS
O TOT OVDOECNTraST)
F C 6 M N 7 5 F C 66 N 2 T P C 66
I N Z T P C 6 N)Z I F C I NI Z I I I
CARD NO. 15 CAUSE
Figure 1. (page 1 of 3)
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CARD NO. 17 ENGINE-POKLLER FAILURE DATA
TIME SINCE OVERHAUL
AM 02 ENGINE 3 ENGINE 4 ENGINE $RA UE'A NUMBE
4 AlRE" SEIA LIMBER
S161 IP 19 23 4 2526 930313 6 717273747767
CARD NO. 18 WEATHER AT ACCIDENT SITE
APPROACH AIDS AVAILABLE
CEILING I
/ / !I
CARD NO. 19 FLIGHT CREW DATA
CARD NO. 20 HUMAN FACTORS
CARD NO. 21 FIRE INFORMATION
xTINGUISHING / ANT,ICING/
CARD NO. 23 ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
INVESTIGATOR IN CHARGE NTS) ACCIDET RELEASE CEIVD CEIVED A SS NVESTIGATION CODE
IN RECORDS IN ANALYSIS COMLETE
'516171,1R3 122 2342527 3 3132439363789464143444444474649 3253
Figure 1. (page 2 of 3)
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SPECIAL DATA
CARD NO. 25 AERIAL APPLICATION / /////// / 
,
PIPS 7 I I 2 P PJPI P " 1 I I I I 1 49
CARD NO, 27 COLLISION BETWEEN AIRCRAFT(THIS AIRCAF
°- ' ~ //,
CARD NO. 2 COLCHING- URVIAAL
6-
, 0
June 1970, Third Edition).Figure .I (page 3 f 3)
TABLE I
ACCIDENT FILE CONTENTS
NO. LABEL CHAR FORMAT NAME
001 FILENO. 5 F5.0 FILE NUMBER
002 MONTH 2 F2.0 MONTH OF ACCIDENT
003. YEAR 2 F2.0 YEAR "
004 HOUR 2 F2.0 HOUR "
005 LOC 2 F2.0 LOCATION OF ACCIDENT
006 ACMAKE 3 F3.0 AIRCRAFT MAKE
007 ACMOD. 2 F2.0 AIRCRAFT MODEL
008 ENGMAKE 2 F2.0 ENGINE MAKE
009 ENGMOD. 2 F2.0 ENGINE MODEL
010 NO.ENG. 1 F1.0 NUMBER OF ENGINES
011 DAMAGE 1 Al AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
012 KIND 1 A1,1K KIND OF FLYING
013 PHASE1 2 Al,lX PHASE OF 1ST ACCIDENT (TYPE = ENG.MALF./FAIL.
014 TYPE2 1 Al TYPE OF SECOND ACCIDENT
015 PHASE2 2' A1,IX PHASE OF SECOND ACCIDENT
016 ALT. 5 F4.0,1X ALTITUDE OF OCCURRENCE
017 FLAND 1 Al FORCED LANDING
018/019 CIRCUMI/CIRCUM2 2 2A1. EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
020 TERRAIN 1 Al TERRAIN
021 TOTHRS 5 F4.0,1X TOTAL HOURS - PILOT
022 PLT.CNTRL 1 Al PILOT AT CONTROL
023 INJURY 1 Al. INJURY INDEX
TABLE I 
(Page 2 of 2)
NO. LABEL CHAR FORMAT NAME
024 TOTABRD 3 F3.0 TOTAL ABOARD
025 PARTPWR 1 Al PARTIAL POWER LOSS
026 TOTPWR 1 Al. COMPLETE POWER LOSS
027 SKYCOND 1 Al SKY CONDITIONS
028/029 PRECIP1/PRECIP2 2 2AI PRECIPITATION (2 CODES)
030 DEIWPTSPRD 2 F2.0 DEW POINT SPREAD
031 TEMP. 3 F3.0 TEMPERATURE
- -
1 IX - NOT APPLICABLE -
032 INDAIR 1 F1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE/FACTOR: INDUCTION AIR/PREHEATCONTROLS, MISUSE
033 UNDET 1 F1.0 , , " UNDETERMINED CAUSE
034 FUELHTR 1 F1.0 , " " FUEL HEATER
035 CARBICE 1 F1.0 , " " CARB. DE-ICING 
SYSTEM
036 FUELDEICE 1 F1.0 , , " FUEL DE-ICING 
SYSTEM
037 CONDCI 1 F1.0 : CONDITIONS 
CONDUCIVE
TO CARB. ICE
038 AIEQUIP 1 F1.0 " : IMPROPER 
USE: ANTI-
ICE, DE-ICE
039 ICEFUEL 1 F1.0 , " " ICE 
IN FUEL
040 ICECARB 1 F1.0 , , " ICE 
IN CARBURETOR
041 ICEIND 1 F1.0" " : ICE IN 
INDUCTION
SYSTEM
TABLE II
ACCIDENT FILE CODES
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
D - DESTROYED
S - SUBSTANTIAL
M - MINOR
N - NONE
9 - UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
KIND OF FLYING
A - INSTRUCTIONAL
B - NONCOMMERCIAL
C - COMMERCIAL
D - MISCELLANEOUS
TYPE OF ACCIDENT
A GRND/WATER LOOP/SWERVE N COLLISION 
-
B DRAGGED WING,POD,FLOAT O
C WHEELS-UP P BIRD STRIKE
D WHEELS DWN LNDG - WATER Q STALL
E GEAR COLLAPSED R FIRE OR EXPLOS
F GEAR RETRACTED. S AIRFRAME 
- FAIL
G HARD LANDING T ENGINE -TEARAWAY
H NOSE OVER/DOWN U ENG MALF/FAIL
I ROLL OVER 
_V PROP/ROTOR FAIL
J OVERSHOT W PROP/ROTOR ACC - PERS
K UNDERSHOOT X JET INTAKE EXH - PERS
L COLLISION WITH-A/C Y PROP/JET/ROTOR BLAST
M COLLISION 
- GRND/WATER Z TURBULENCE
PHASE
A - STATIC
B - TAXI
C - TAKEOFF
D - INFLIGHT
E - LANDING
- - UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
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TABLE II (Page 2 of 4)
TERRAIN
A - MOUNTAINOUS H - DENSE WITH TREES
B - HILLY I - CITY AREA
C - ROLLING J - PLOWED
D - LEVEL, FLAT K - WATER
E - FROZEN Y - OTHER
F - ROCKY 9 - UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
G - SANDY
PILOT AT CONTROLS
A - PILOT IN COMMAND E - NONE
B - COPILOT F - BOTH PILOTS
C - DUAL STUDENT Y - OTHER
D - CHECK PILOT 9 - UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
INJURY INDEX
F - FATAL
G - SERIOUS
M - MINOR
N - NONE
9 - UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
PARTIAL/COMPLETE POWER LOSS
A - ONE ENGINE
B - TWO ENGINES
C - THREE ENGINES
D - FOUR ENGINES
9 - UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
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TABLE II (Page 3 of 4)
FORCED LANDING PRECAUTIONARY LANDING
CODE
A FORCED LANDING ON AIRPORT/SEAPLANE BASE HELIPORT
B FORCED LANDING OFF AIRPORT ON LAND
C FORCED LANDING OFF AIRPORT ON WATER (DITCHING)
D PRECAUTIONARY LANDING ON AIRPORT
E PRECAUTIONARY LANDING OFF AIRPORT
9 UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
CODE
A LOW ON FUEL
B SMOKE IN COCKPIT
,C PASSENGER DISTURBANCE
D FALSE FIRE WARNING
E LATERAL CONTROL PROBLEM
F PITCH CONTROL PROBLEM
G DIRECTIONAL CONTROL PROBLEM
H ADVERSE/UNFAVORABLE WEATHER
I APPROACHING DARKNESS
J SUSPECTED OR KNOWN AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
K SUSPECTED MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY
L DOOR/PANEL OPEN
M AIRFRAME BUFFET
N UNUSUAL NOISE
P PHYSICAL CONDITION OF PASSENGER
Q FUMES IN CABIN
R PROP/ENGINE VIBRATION
B UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
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TABLE II (Page 4 of 4)
SKY CONDITION (Local weather at time of accident)
CODE
A CLEAR
B SCATTERED (Above 1,000 feet)
C SCATTERED (Below 1,000 feet)
D BROKEN
E BROKEN/LOWER SCATTERED
F OVERCAST
G OVERCAST/LOWER SCATTERED
H PARTIAL OBSCURATION
I OBSCURATION
9 UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
PRECIPITATION OF ACCIDENT SITE
CODE
A HAIL (A) H SNOW SHOWERS (SW)
B SLEET (E) I THUNDERSTORM (T)
C DRIZZLE (L) J FREEZING DRIZZLE (ZL)
D RAIN (R) K FREEZING RAIN (ZR)
E RAIN SHOWERS (RW) L NONE
F SNOW (S) 9 UNKNOWN/NOT REPORTED
G SNOW GRAINS (SG)/SNOW
PELLETS (SP)
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(1) Included accidents for the years 1969, 1970, 1971,
1972, and 1973.
(2) Included only engine malfunction/failure accidents.
(3) Included only fixed-wing, reciprocating engine accidents
which occurred within the continental U.S.
(4) Excluded accidents due to fuel exhaustion.
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DATA ANALYSIS
The analyses performed on the computer data base consisted
primarily of crosstabulations of variables selected from the 41
variables included in the data base, and subsequent statistical
analysis of the resulting comparisons. The primary tool used for
this purpose was the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) (ref. 9). SPSS is an integrated package of programs for
statistical analysis, data base management and file manipulation.
Using these programs, selected variables may be transformed or
recoded, new variables created through computations based on
existing variables, and statistical procedures executed. This
package of programs provides efficient analysis of a given data
base with minimal programming effort. In addition, special-
purpose statistical programs were used, and hand calculations
performed in selected cases. The principal results of all
analyses are summarized in the following sections.
Examination of Aircraft and Engine Makes Under Conditions
Conducive to Carburetor/Induction System Icing
As part of an initial examination of the data base to
determine data base variables important to the study of
carburetor/induction system icing, aircraft makes and engine
makes were compared under conditions conducive and not conducive
to carburetor/induction system icing. One of the cause/factor
variables included in the data base was an indication of whether
the accident investigator considered the conditions conducive to
carburetor icing. For the present it is assumed that the
conditions are not conducive to icing if the accident investiga-
tor did not indicate such conditions existed; the validity of
this assumption will be discussed later.
The results comparing aircraft makes are presented in
Table III, while the results for engine makes are given in
Table IV. As no practical or statistical significance exists
between the major manufacturers of either airframes or engines,
no distinction between makes was carried through the subsequent
analyses. These results contradict informal reports that
specific manufacturers produced designs more or less prone to
carburetor icing difficulties.
Probable Cause/Factor by Year
Selected causes/factors, indicated by the accident
investigator, are tabulated in Table V by year. The causes/
factors selected are: (1) induction air, preheat cockpit
controls, (2) power plant failure for undetermined reasons,
(3) anti-icing, de-icing, and carburetor de-icing systems,
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT MAKE SENSITIVITY TO
CARBURETOR/INDUCTION SYSTEM ICING CONDITIONS
NO. OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED UNDER - PERCENT OF TOTAL
ACCIDENTS THAT
CONDITIONS OCCURRED UNDER
LIRCRAFT CONDUCIVE OTHER CONDITIONS CON-
MAKE TO ICING* CONDITIONS DUCIVE TO ICING
A 13 88 12.9
B 17 298 5.4
C 126 989 11.3
D 7 43 14.0
E 11 84 11.6
F 97 935 9.4
G 5 39 11.4
H 8 73 9.9
Other 32 690 4.4
*As defined by the accident investigator.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF ENGINE MAKE SENSITIVITY TO
CARBURETOR/INDUCTION SYSTEM ICING CONDITIONS
NO. OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED UNDER - PERCENT OF TOTAL
ACCIDENTS THAT
CONDITIONS OCCURRED UNDER
kIRCRAFT CONDUCIVE OTHER CONDITIONS CON-
MAKE TO ICING* CONDITIONS DUCIVE TO ICING
A 6 86 6.5
B 144 1376 9.5
C 153 1437 9.6
D 7 246 2.8
E 3 37 7.5
Other 3 57 5.0
Total 316 3239 8.9
*As defined by the accident investigator.
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(4) weather conditions conducive to carburetor/induction system
icing, (5) improper use, or failure to use, anti-icing de-icing
equipment, (6) ice in fuel, (7) ice in carburetor, and (8) ice in
the induction system. More than one (usually five or more)
cause/factor may be indicated by the investigator for a given
accident.
A number of results accrue from examination of Table V:
(1) There is a statistically significant trend for
accidents within the selected data base to decrease over the five
year period examined (P<.05).
(2) Relatively few accidents involve identifiable failures
of the controls and systems associated with carburetor/induction
system icing.
(3) There are a large number of powerplant failures for
undetermined reasons.
(4) There are approximately 65 accidents per year, on the
average, for which evidence of ice is found in the fuel or
induction system.
(5) The number of cases for which ice in the carburetor is
cited as a probable cause/factor often exceeds the number of
cases for which it is cited that conditions are conducive to
carburetor/induction system icing. Apparently the investigators
may omit indicating that the conditions are conducive to
carburetor icing when other, more specific, evidence exists.
Composite Carburetor/Induction Ice Cause/Factor
It was noted in Table V that a number of probable causes/
factors may be indicated by the accident investigator either
singly or in combination. A composite cause/factor was formed to
avoid this confusion. The composite indicator was defined as a
probable Carburetor/Induction Ice Cause/Factor if any of the
following cause/factors were noted by the accident investigator:
(1) induction air/preheat controls, or (2) the carburetor
de-icing system, or (3) improper use of anti-ice/de-ice
equipment, or (4)--ce in the carburetor, or (5) ice in the
induction system.
The composite carburetor/induction ice cause/factor (C/I Ice
Cause/Factor) is tabulated in Table VI over the five year period
included in this study. While the number of carburetor/induction
system ice accidents may appear to decrease over the five year
period (as did the total number of accidents in the data base)
the number of accidents in years 1969 and 1970 are not statis-
tically significant from the number in years 1972 and 1973
(P<.33). Based on the composite index, the number of such
accidents averages 74 per year.
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TABLE V
ACCIDENTS WITH ICING AS PROBABLE CAUSE/FACTOR BY YEAR
YEAR
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
PROBABLE CAUSE OF ACCIDENT Number of Accidents Total
Misuse of induction air,
preheat cockpit controls 5' 0 1 1 1 8
Powerplant failure 
-
reason undetermined 206 228 203 158 173 968
Carburetor de-icing system
malfunction 1 7 1 2 3 14
Conditions conducive to
carburetor/induction
system icing 79 47 70 65 55 316
Improper operation 
-
failed to use anti-
icing/de-icing equipment 85 58 64 69 50 326
Ice in fuel 4 3 7 8 4 26
Ice in carburetor 82 59 70 63 52 326
Ice in induction system 2 1 3 1 4 11
Total 760 730 730 661 674 3555
TABLE VI
COMPOSITE C/I ICE CAUSE BY YEAR
YEAR
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Number of Accidents Total
WAS C/I ICE No 666 659 658 587 615 3185
CAUSE OF
ACCIDENT?* Yes 94 71 72 74 59 370
Total 760 730 730 661 674 3555
*Composite C/I Cause: Misuse of induction air/preheat controls,
carburetor de-icing system malfunction, improper use of
de-icing system, ice in carburetor, or ice in induction
system.
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Also, as previously noted in Table V, Table VII indicates
that a large number of carburetor/induction system icing acci-
dents are not noted by many investigators as occurring when the
conditions are conducive to icing; consequently, a better
indicator of the conditions appropriate to such accidents must be
constructed.
Pilot Experience as a Factor in Carburetor/Induction
System Icing Accidents
Pilot experience, in terms of total number of flying hours,
is cross-tabulated with the composite C/I Ice Cause/Factor in
Table VIII. The percent of carburetor/induction ice accidents
decreases with the total number of pilot hours; however, the
decrease is statistically significant (P<.05) only for pilot
hours greater than 1,000 hours. Stated in other terms, only
pilots with over 1,000 hours experience seem to possess the skill
and knowledge to perform significantly better in avoiding
carburetor/induction system icing than pilots with less than 1,000
hours total flying time. About 68% of the carburetor/induction
icing accidents involve pilots with less than 1,000 total hours.
-TABLE VII
COMPOSITE C/I ICE CAUSE BY INVESTIGATOR'S JUDGMENT
THAT CONDITIONS ARE CONDUCIVE TO C/I ICE
Were Conditions Conducive to C/I
Ice? (Investigator's Judgment)
No Yes
Number of Accidents Total
WAS C/I ICE No 3173 12 3185
CAUSE OF
ACCIDENT?* Yes 66 304 370
Total 3239 316 3555
*Composite C/I Ice Cause: Misuse of induction air/preheat
controls, carburetor de-icing system malfunction, improper
use of de-icing system, ice in carburetor, or ice in induction
system.
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TABLE VIII
EFFECT OF PILOT EXPERIENCE ON C/I ICE AS
ACCIDENT CAUSE/FACTOR
Cause of Accident
Total C/I Ice Other
Accidents
Pilot for Percent of Percent of
Experience Experience Number of Total Number of Total
Hours Range Accidents Accidents Accidents Accidents
10 to 100 477 70 14.7 407 85.3
100 to 500 1000 125 12.5 875 87.5
500 to 100C 519 55 10.6 464 89.4
>1000 1559 120 7.7 1439 92.3
>10 3555 370 10.4 1559 89.6
Composite Indicator to C/I Ice Conditions
As previously noted, there is reason to believe that condi-
tions are appropriate for carburetor/induction system icing more
often than indicated by the accident investigators. A composite
indicator (Conditions Appropriate) was constructed based on the
following: (1) conditions were considered appropriate by the
accident investigator, or (2) there was an indication of
precipitation at the accident site, or (3) the temperature and
dew point were within the profile presented in Figure 2. The
temperature/dew point profile of Figure 2 is generated by the
Department of Transportation (taken from Gardner and Moon, 1971);
the solid line profile was that used in the computer implementa-
tion and is to be considered an approximate indicator of the
existence of conditions appropriate for carburetor icing.
Unfortunately, the existence of temperature/dew point data was
rare in the NTSB data base.
The number of accidents occurring when conditions are
appropriate for icing according to the composite indicator are
presented in Table IX. Approximately 18% of the accidents in the
reduced data base used in this study occurred when the conditions
were conducive to carburetor/induction system icing. Based on
these data, one may estimate the maximum number of accidents due
to this cause at about 128 per year.
It is interesting to note in Table X that about 13% of the
accidents for which the cause is undetermined occur when the
conditions are appropriate for carburetor/induction icing.
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TABLE IX
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED UNDER
CONDITIONS APPROPRIATE FOR C/I ICE* BY YEAR
Were Conditions Appropriate for
C/I Ice?
Yes No
Total
Accidents Percent of Percent offor Number of Total Number of Total'(Year(s) Year(s) Accidents Accidents Accidents Accidents
1969 760 126 16.6 634 83.4
1970 730 134 18.4 596 81.6
1971 730 121 16.6 609 83.4
1972 661 144 21.8 517 78.2
1973 674 113 16.8 561 83.2
1969 to
1973 3555 638 18.0 2917 82.0
*Conditions appropriate for C/I ice: Indicated by accidentinvestigator, temperature/dew point within profile, or
precipitation at accident site.
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TABLE X
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED UNDER
CONDITIONS APPROPRIATE FOR C/I ICING* BY
CAUSE DETERMINATION
Number of
Accidents Percent
Number of accidents for which cause was
determined 2587 100
Number of these accidents for which
conditions were appropriate for
C/I icing 511 14.4
Number of these accidents for which
conditions were not appropriate for
C/I icing 2076 85.6
Number of accidents for which cause
was not determined 968 100
Number of these accidents for which
condition was appropriate for
C/I icing 127 13.1
Number of these accidents for which
conditions were not appropriate for
C/I icing 841 86.9
*Conditions appropriate for C/I ice: Indicated by accident
investigator, temperature/dew point within profile, or
precipitation at accident site.
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Analysis of Accidents Occurring Under Conditions
Conducive to C/I Ice
Table XI presents an analysis of accidents occurring duringconditions conducive to carburetor/induction icing. At least319 out of a total of 638 accidents are attributable to
carburetor/ihduction icing, or about 50%. Another 127 accidents
occurring under appropriate conditions are due to undetermined
reasons. Thus a total of 446 accidents might be due to suchicing causes, or an estimated maximum of 70%; it might be
expected"that about 50% of these are due to carburetor/induction
icing. Consequently, it may be estimated that, when theconditions are appropriate, between 50% and 70% are due to
carburetor/induction system icing.
Severity of Carburetor/Induction System Icing Accidents
It should be clear that, while a number of accidents mayhave.involved carburetor/induction system icing as a cause/factor,
the flights eventually terminated with a forced landing andpossible collision with a ground object. As is the case with
other engine/malfunction failure accidents, approximately 80%resulted in substantial damage to the aircraft, and the
remainder resulted in destroyed aircraft (see Table XII).However, as indicated in Table XIII, 230 of 370 accidents (62%)resulted in no personal injury and only 14% resulted in serious or
fatal injury. The distribution of occupants involved in C/I icingaccidents is presented in Table XIV; the net result is thatbetween 720 (for C/I ice conditions) and 977 (including possibleaccidents with undetermined reasons) persons have been involvedin such accidents over the five year period considered in this
study (between 144 and 195 per year).
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0TABLE XI
ACCIDENT CAUSE/FACTOR BY COMPOSITE INDICATOR
OF C/I CONDITIONS
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS TOT
CONDITIONS APPROPRIATE ACCIDENT CAUSE/FACTOR
FOR C/I ICE? C/I ICE NO C/I ICE UNDETERMINED
Yes 319 192 127 638
No 51 2025 841 2917
Total 370 2217 968 3555
TABLE XII
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE DUE TO C/I ICING
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS TOTAI
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE
MINOR SUBSTANTIAL DESTROYED NOT REPORTED
C/I ice 1 309 60 0 370
Undetermined,
with C/I ice
conditions 0 80 47 0 127
Other 0 2425 632 1 3058
Total 1 2814 739 1 3555
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TABLE XIII
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING INJURY DUE TO
C/I ICING
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS TOTAL
INJURY INDEX
Accident Cause None Minor Serious Fatal Unkn.
C/I Ice 230 87 34 19 0 370
Undetermined,
with C/I Ice
Conditions 51 38 22 16 0 127
Other 1803 652 347 255 1 3058
Total 2084 777 403 290 1 3555
TABLE XIV
NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS INVOLVED IN C/I ICING ACCIDENTS
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS TOTAL
NUMBER ABOARD
Accident Cause NR* 1 2 3 4 5 6 >6
C/I Ice 0 143 154 38 27 4 2 2 370
Undetermined,
with C/I Ice
Conditions 0 51 51 13 7 2 0 3 127
Other 1 1350 1030 289 281 59 23 25 3058
Total 1 1544 1235 340 315 65 25 30 3555
TOTAL PERSONS INVOLVED *Not reported
Accident Cause IN ACCIDENTS
C/I Ice 720
Undetermined,
with C/I Ice
Conditions 257
Other 6105
Total 7082
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DISCUSSION
The Difficulty of Diagnosing Carburetor/Induction System Icing
A fundamental problem affecting the study of the severity
of carburetor/induction system icing in general aviation acci-
dents is the inherent difficulty of diagnosing carburetor/
induction icing. If ice has caused an accident, the ice will
melt and the resulting water may evaporate; so, unless the
investigator is astute and has an initial strong suspicion of
carburetor icing, the cause/factor associated with the accident
may not be properly identified.
Since this type of accident may be so easily mis-diagnosed,
it is believed that the results of this study underestimate the
magnitude of the problem. A broad definition of "carburetor
icing" has been taken, and some reasonable extrapolations to
include the probable number of "undetermined" accidents which
may be carburetor icing have been made in this study. Neverthe-
less, it is believed that the estimates made in this study are
quite conservative and that a number of additional accidents
could have included carburetor/induction icing as a probable
cause/factor. Further, the findings of this study concentrate on
the accident data available; a large number of forced landings
occur each year which are not included in the accident data base.
A Context for Data Interpretation
Over a five-year period analyzed in this study, an average
of 65 carburetor ice accidents per year are identified by the
accident investigators, and one may extend this estimate to
approximately 90 probable carburetor/induction icing accidents
per year. That is, there are about that many general aviation
accidents per year which involve carburetor/induction icing;
however, a number of other probable cause/factors are generally
also involved.
Compared to the approximately five thousand total general
aviation accidents per year, and the approximately one thousand
engine malfunction/failure accidents per year, the less than one
hundred carburetor/induction accidents per year may seem small.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that carburetor/
induction icing can only occur when the weather conditions are
appropriate. Viewed in this context, the picture changes, for
when the weather conditions are conducive to icing, 50 percent
to 70 percent of all engine malfunction/failure type accidents
(which are not due to fuel exhaustion) include carburetor/
induction icing as- a probable cause/factor. That is,
if the weather conditions are conducive, if the engine
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malfunctions or fails with fuel still available to the engine,
then carburetor/induction icing is involved more than half of
the time.
Further, carburetor/induction system icing is a widespread
problem. Such icing can occur anywhere, even at temperatures
over 310.9 0K (100 0F), and is equally likely throughout the
year. Pilots with long experience become involved in such
accidents, although more than two-thirds of carburetor/induction
system icing accidents involve pilots with less than 1000 hours
of total flying time. Apparently, any pilot, wherever he/she
may be flying, at any time of the year, may encounter carburetor/
induction system icing.
Severity of Carburetor/Induction System Icing
Of course, as with many other accident causes/factors, the
injurious and damaging aspects of an accident for which
carburetor/induction icing is a.probable cause/factor are
associated with the terminating forced or precautionary landing.
One hundred and forty-four persons per year, on the average, are
involved in carburetor icing accidents, about 4 of these
accidents involve fatalities, about 7 per year involve serious
injury, and almost all of these accidents involve substantial
damage or destruction of the aircraft. Consequently, carburetor/
induction system icing accidents are just about as serious as
any other accident involving a forced landing or precautionary
landing. Other types of accidents occur more often: for
example, accidents involving fuel exhaustion occur about twice
as often as those involving carburetor/induction icing; but
when weather conditions are conducive, carburetor/induction
system icing is the most common cause for engine malfunction/
failure.
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CONCLUSIONS
Carburetor/induction system icing is a serious
threat existing in general aviation operations. Given that
fuel is available, under the proper weather conditions, which
occur frequently and regularly throughout the year, carburetor/
induction icing is the most common cause of engine malfunction/
failure in general aviation. Overall, this cause amounts for
about 10 percent of engine malfunction/failures, making it a
major cause for concern. Carburetor/induction icing is a
particular threat to the pilot with less than 1000 hours of
total flying time.
While engineering analysis was not included in the current
study, the review of the literature indicates a strong
possibility that this problem may be solvable. The problem
may yield to (1) efforts to eliminate icing through
carburetor/induction system design and fuel additives, and/or
(2) efforts to either increase pilot awareness through improved
display of icing information or automation of the pilots
function for the control of icing countermeasures. The payoff
would be high: 65-90 accidents per year could be eliminated
along with the attendant death, injury and damage.
The analysis of accident data is severely limited for
investigation of a problem as insidious and difficult to detect
as carburetor/induction icing. Further investigation of the
problem is recommended using flight or ground-based facilities
permitting the control of induction icing. Under controlled
conditions, the ability of the pilot to detect, recognize and
take proper action can be accurately assessed. It is suspected
that given such data it will be found that the findings of this
study, which label carburetor/induction icing as a major problem,
have underestimated the magnitude and frequency of carburetor/
induction system icing occurrences.
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APPENDIX A: INFORMATION SOURCES
GENERAL SOURCES
AEROSPACE SAFETY RESEARCH AND DATA INSTITUTE (ASRDI)
AIRCRAFT OWNERS ASSOCIATION
AIR FORCE FLIGHT DYNAMICS LABORATORY (AFFDL)
AIRWORK SERVICE DIVISION
ALLEN AIRCRAFT (DIVISION OF AAR CORP.)
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE.
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS
ANDREWS & ASSOCIATES
ATLANTIC AVIATION CORPORATION
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERING (SAE JOURNAL)
AVCO (LYCOMING DIVISION) CORP.
AVQUIPO INC.
BORG-WARNER CORP. (MARVEL-SCHEBLER DIV.)
BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFETY (NTSB: WASH., D.C.)
CALIFORNIA AVIATION COUNCIL
CANADIAN CURTISS-WRIGHT LTD.
CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO.
CHANDLER EVANS CONTROL SYSTEMS (DIV. OF COLT INDUSTRIES)
CHEMICAL PROPULSION INFORMATION AGENCY
CHRYSLER CORP., DEFENSE SPACE GROUP
CIVIL AEROMEDICAL INSTITUTE
COLT INDUSTRIES
COMBUSTION INSTITUTE
COOPER-BESSEMER
E.I. DU PONT CO.
ETHYL CORPORATION
FAA SAFETY DATA BRANCH FLIGHT STANDARDS TECHNICAL DIVISION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (LOS ANGELES)
FIELD AVIATION CO., LTD.
FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION, INC.
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FRANKLIN GNO CORP.
GUGGENHEIM CENTER FOR AEROSPACE HEALTH AND SAFETY
JET AVIATION CORP.
JOHNS HOPKINS APPLIED PHYSICS LAB
LARSON AERODEVELOPMENT
LEAVENS BROS., LTD.
MINISTRY OF (CANADIAN) TRANSPORT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
NATIONAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SCHOOL (NAAIS)
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
ELSON AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING INFORMATION CENTER
ONAN DIVISION, ONAN CORPORATION
REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION EXCHANGE
SOUTHWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE
STANDARD OIL COMPANY (OHIO)
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY:
DEPARTMENT OF AERONAUTICAL AND ASTRONAUTICAL ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY INSTITUTE
TRW EQUIPMENT, INC.
TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS, AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS DIVISION
TRANSAERO INC.
UNITED AIRCRAFT OF CANADA, LTD.
WHITE SUPERIOR, DIVISION OF WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS:
STAN ROSCOE
JESSE STONECIPHER
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ACTUARIAL SOURCES
ABBOTT, WHITE, AND CO., INC.
AERO COVERAGES, INC.
AERO INSURANCE AGENCY
AIR ASSOCIATES, INC.
AIRBANC OF AMERICA, INC.
AIRWAY CASUALTY CO.
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, INC.
ASSOCIATED AVIATION UNDERWRITERS
AVEMCO AIRCRAFT INVESTMENT CORPORATION
AVEMCO CORPORATION
AVIATION INSURANCE SERVICE
AVIATION OFFICE OF AMERICA, INC.
RICHARD J. BERLOW & CO., INC.
J.H. BLADES & CO., INC.
BOWES & CO., INC.
C&A FLIGHT CREW INSURANCE, INC.
CESSNA FINANCE CORP.
C.I.T. LEASING CORP.
COMMERCIAL CREDIT EQUIPMENT CORP.
CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
CONTINENTAL ASSOCIATES, INC.
DELTA AGENCIES, INC.
ELECTRA FINANCIAL GROUP
FAIRFAX UNDERWRITERS SERVICES, INC.
G. SHANNON GROVER
HARLAN INC. OF PENNSYLVANIA
HOLTON INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.
INA REINSURANCE CO.
INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA
INTERNATIONAL AIRCRAFT SALES
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION UNDERWRITERS, INC.
KUDLICH GENERAL INSURANCE AGENCY, LTD.
MANN-KLINE, INC.
NATIONAL AVIATION UNDERWRITERS
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PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITERS
PARKER & CO. INTERNATIONAL, INC.
PETER J. MC BREEN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
THE SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES
TEX-WIDE INSURANCE
TRANSWORLD INSURANCE BROKERS
WRIGHT & CO.
AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS
AERONCA, INC.
AERO RESOURCES
AERO SPORT
AMERICAN AVIATION CORPORATION
ATLANTIC AVIATION
AVCO-LYCOMING
BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
BELLANCA AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO.
CONTINENTAL
ENSTROM CORPORATION
EVANGEL AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
FAIRCHILD INDUSTRIES, INC.
FRANKLIN
MAULE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
PITTS AVIATION ENTERPRISES
PRATT & WHITNEY
PERSONNEL CONTACTED
WILLIAM ALLEN: FAA ACCIDENT PREVENTION & ANALYSIS
VINCENT BROPHY: FAA
JAMES CONSTANTINE: NTSB ACCIDENT RECORDS SECTION
JOHN CRAWFORD: BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFETY
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ROBERT CRESTON: FAA: TRANSPORTATION SAFETY INSTITUTE
GENE KING: FAA, DOT
DAVE PARKER: NTSB
JOHN REED: NTSB
BOB SHAW: NTSB
JIM WEBSTER: FAA FLIGHT STATISTICS BRANCH
GREGG VAN BRUNT: FLIGHT SAFETY COUNSELLOR
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